preme Court dicta 5 and more general considerations of federal-state comity. It will conclude that the recent case of Brown v. Estelle 6 represents an appropriate resolution of the issues.
INITIAL APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIMS
A state prisoner could not base a habeas corpus petition on an allegation that he had been denied a speedy trial until 1966, when the Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial was guaranteed to state defendants through the fourteenth amendment. 7 Although few habeas petitions claiming denial of a speedy trial were initially filed by state defendants, the number of such petitions increased greatly after Smith v. Hooey 8 established the obligation of a state with charges pending against a prisoner incarcerated in another state to make a full good faith effort to bring the defendant to trial. 9 The first court of appeals to apply the exhaustion requirement to a pretrial habeas corpus petition claiming denial of a speedy trial was the Fourth Circuit in Kane v. Virginia.1 0 The court admitted that federal habeas relief was not ordinarily available to a state prisoner before trial, but reasoned that "the peculiar nature of the right to a speedy trial requires an exception to this rule." I" This reasoning was expressly adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Chauncey v. Second Judicial District Court of Nevada,12 in which the court held that the petitioner had exhausted his state remedies by presenting a speedy trial claim in every level of the state's judicial system, even though he had not yet been brought to trial. 13 A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Beck v. United States, 14 where the exhaustion requirement was deemed to have been met since the petitioner had presented his speedy trial claim by a writ of mandamus to both the state trial court and the state's highest court. 15 The state of the law following these 16 11. Id. at 1372. The court felt the nature of the right to a speedy trial to be peculiar because "denial of a speedy trial adversely affects both the prisoner's present circumstances and his ability to defend himself in the future" and stated that "only a present remedy can lift its dual oppressions." Id.
To provide future guidance to the district courts, the court concluded its opinion by stating that the state charges against a habeas corpus petitioner should be dismissed when it is proved: I. that the prisoner demanded a speedy trial, 2. that the state nevertheless failed to make a diligent effort to obtain him for trial, and 3. that he has exhausted his state remedies . . . by seeking dismissal of the charges against him because of unconstitutional delay. Id. at 1373.
12. 453 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971). The petitioner, by'state habeas corpus procedures, had sought to bar prosecution by Nevada authorities on the grounds that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The Nevada charges had been pending against the petitioner while he was incarcerated for several years in an Arizona prison. Id. at 390.
13. 453 F.2d at 390 n. I. According to the court, requiring the petitioner to delay federal review until after his trial would have been "an exercise in futility . . . especially when the nature of the claimed right is examined ......
Id. 14. 442 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1971). The petitioner in this case was incarcerated in a federal prison located in Texas when charges were filed against him by Texas authorities. After a detainer warrant was served upon him, the petitioner filed a writ of mandamus with the state trial court, requesting dismissal of the charges on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. After a denial of his request by both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Texas, the petitioner requested habeas relief from the federal courts.
15. Id. at 1038. The court held simply that "the [petitioner] has exhausted the state remedies available to him," and reversed the district court, which had denied the petition for failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id.
16. In addition to these courts, it is possible that the Third Circuit also favored federal habeas review of a pretrial speedy trial claim. In United States ex rel. Jennings v. Pennsylvania, 429 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1970), in an opinion written by Judge Seitz, a district court's denial of a pretrial habeas petition on exhaustion grounds was vacated with instructions to review the petitioner's speedy trial claim and grant relief if warranted. This decision, however, may not have been based on the "peculiar nature" of the right to a speedy trial, as were those of the other circuits, but could possibly have been an angry reaction to a "sorry narrative of official inaction or indifference." Id. at 523. Petitioner had made innumerable efforts over several years to have the prosecutor, who did not even appear at the habeas hearing, bring him to trial. According to Judge Seitz, "the facts here alleged concerning the deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, if true, call out for something more [than denial of federal review] from a concerned judiciary." Id.
One circuit may have taken a position opposite to that reflected in the decisions discussed in the text. and related district court decisions 17 could be stated as follows: the exhaustion requirement of federal habeas corpus is satisfied by a state petitioner when he has presented his claim of denial of a speedy trial to all levels of the state judicial system, notwithstanding the fact that he has not yet been tried and convicted by a state court.
It was at this point in the relaxation of the exhaustion requirement that the Supreme Court decided Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky,' I dicta from which persuaded several of the lower courts to restrict substantially the circumstances under which a pretrial habeas petitioner could obtain review of his speedy trial claim. 1 9 Although the Court had granted certiorari in order to resolve jurisdictional problems created by a ruling many years earlier, 20 the issue as to whether the petitioner had exhausted his state remedies had first to be considered and resolved in the petitioner's favor. The fact that the petitioner was requesting that the state of Kentucky be ordered to bring him to trial, and not that the charges be dismissed, was seen by the Court as crucial in establishing that state remedies had been exhausted:
The 21. The petitioner faced not only the obstacle presented by the Ahrens rule but also the contention by Kentucky that state remedies would not be exhausted until the petitioner had been convicted in state court. 410 U.S. at 487. Before reaching the Ahrens issue, the Court had to hold that a habeas corpus petitioner could request a federal court to command a state to bring him to trial. The petitioner in Braden made only this request, and did not petition for dismissal of the charges against him. Id. at 490.
[ Vol. 1977:707 prosecution, but to enforce [Kentucky's] obligations to provide him with a state court forum. 22 To underscore the limited nature of its holding, the Court emphasized that "nothing we have said would permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.' '23 This assurance, however, did not satisfy three dissenting Justices, 24 who declared that the majority opinion was "a conversion of federal habeas corpus into a pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.' '25 Contrary to the dissenters' suggestion, however, the Braden decision has played a major role in limiting the circumstances under which a petitioner claiming denial of a speedy trial can be deemed to have exhausted his state remedies before trial. The dissenters' concern that federal habeas review had extended too far into the pretrial stage of state proceedings was not precipitated by the Braden holding alone. Several recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as cases from the courts of appeals, had held many forms of pretrial judicial control over defendants to constitute "custody," making such defendants eligible to file petitions under 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 & 2254 (1970) presented to all levels of the state's judicial system, because the state appellate courts had only denied interlocutory review of his speedy trial claim without considering the claim on its merits. 27 Concluding that there had been no exhaustion of state remedies, the court next considered whether any "extraordinary circumstances" required federal review prior to exhaustion. 28 The court found none, perceiving "nothing in the nature of the speedy trial right to qualify it as a per se 'extraordinary circumstance,' "29 notwithstanding the Kane and Chauncey decisions, 30 28. The exhaustion requirement is not an inflexible or absolute rule. As early as Reid v. Jones, 187 U.S. 153 (1902), the Supreme Court recognized that a federal court could intervene by writ of habeas corpus in advance of the final action by the state's highest court, in "certain exceptional cases." Id. at 154. In a more recent case, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), the Court emphasized that the "general rule [requiring exhaustion] is not rigid and inflexible; district courts may deviate from it and grant relief in special circumstances." Id. at 520-21.
The "exceptional circumstances" that relax the requirement of exhaustion are, by definition, rare. One example is the situation that existed in Frisbie, in which a man living in Chicago was forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked, and taken to Michigan for trial. Id. at 520. The "exceptional circumstance" cited by the Court was the frequency with which such actions were gaining approval from district courts, thus necessitating expeditious review by the Supreme Court. See also United States ex rel. Richardson v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1972) (district court took jurisdiction over the constitutionality of the petitioner's confinement and interrupted service of his sentence).
29. 515 F.2d at 446. The cases cited in the previous footnote seem to support the position of the Moore court in that "exceptional circumstances" in this context refer to the particular facts of each case with no particular type of claim constituting a per se "extraordinary circumstance." See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521-22 (1952) . A strong argument can be made for a per se rule, however, based on the language in Kane and Chauncey referring to the "peculiar nature" of the right to a speedy trial. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
30. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text. 31. 515 F.2d at 445-46. The court emphasized that the petitioner was not seeking to enforce the state's duty to provide him with a trial, as in Braden. On the contrary, the request by the petitioner was considered to be the very attempt to abort a state trial that the dicta in Braden suggested must not be aided by federal courts. Id. at 446.
32. 515 F.2d at 447. 33. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This decision is the modern cornerstone of the doctrine restraining federal intervention in state judicial proceedings. The case arose when a petitioner, indicted for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, sought a federal injunction against his prosecution on the ground that such prosecution inhibited the exercise of his rights of free speech and press.
In holding that an injunction should not issue, the Court gave as justification the longstanding public policy against federal injunction of state criminal proceedings in the absence of irreparable injury both great and immediate. Id. at 46. See text accompanying notes 48-57 infra for a discussion of the standards to be met before federal intervention is justified.
For an exhaustive discussion of the Younger decisions and their rationale, see Comment,
Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523.
34. According to the court: Although the doctrines of "habeas corpus-exhaustion" and "Younger-abstention" are not directly related, they share many characteristics in common. They are both predicated upon interests of federalism and comity; they both recognize exceptions for "extraordinary circumstances"; both doctrines are doctrines of judicial restraint; they both envisage adequate state remedies; and they both bar petitioners who seek to abort state prosecutions, prior to trial or final state review. [A] federal court may not interfere in an ongoing state criminal prosecution in the pretrial habeas corpus context absent a showing of prosecutional bad faith or harassment or other "extraordinary circumstances" which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable injury which is clear and imminent and for which there is no adequate remedy at law .... 394 F. Supp. at 1174.
It is ironic that Moore may have created this confusion and stimulated the use of Younger in the habeas context to deny review of a speedy trial claim. The irony results from Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1974), which involved a petitioner who demanded dismissal of charges on speedy trial grounds without having attempted to gain state appellate review of his claim. Although the Third Circuit felt constrained to deny the petition on exhaustion grounds, it emphasized that:
If. . .the Petitioner had demanded a speedy trial of the. . .[state] courts ... had moved to dismiss the charges for lack of speedy prosecution, and had sought and obtained appellate review of the denial of his motion to dismiss, habeas corpus relief might be available ....
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A similar analysis was used by the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York 35 to dismiss a pretrial habeas petition alleging denial of a speedy trial. Once again the Braden dicta was invoked to refute the petitioner's assertion that the holding in Braden supported his claimed exhaustion of all state remedies. 36 The relief requested by the petitioner, the court held, was completely foreclosed by the principles enunciated in Younger. 37 As will be explained below, it would appear that the reliance on Younger in this situation is misplaced, for the following reasons: (1) the general doctrinal framework of which Younger is a part is one significantly different from that of habeas corpus; (2) the basic function intended for Younger may have been to allow the Court to retreat from a prior decision greatly expanding the role of federal courts in the state judicial process,
Although this language is of course dictum, it indicates that the Third Circuit may be the only circuit after Braden and Younger to acknowledge the power of a federal court to review a pretrial petition alleging denial of a speedy trial. The principles of Younger played no part in this earlier Third Circuit decision.
It is worth noting that the concurring judge in Moore, Judge Seitz, thought it unnecessary to consider the question of exhaustion and the effect of Younger, noting only that:
The emphasis by the Supreme Court in Braden . . ., on the fact that the petitioner there did not seek to abort a state proceeding compels me to conclude that where, as here, a "derailment of a pending state proceeding" is sought, intervention by a federal court cannot be permitted. In all of these cases the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury, the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is "both great and immediate ...... Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected right must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. Id. at 295-96 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) ).
while at the same time retaining some flexibility; and (3) a state which has denied a prisoner his right to a speedy trial is not entitled to the deference Younger extends in the name of federal-state comity.
As has been pointed out in recent decisions, Younger involved a suit for a federal injunction against state proceedings, not a petition requesting habeas corpus relief. 38 The importance of this distinction is that it establishes the general context in which Younger was decided and bears on the justification for the holding. It should be noted that the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against state proceedings is forbidden by statute, except in very limited circumstances. 39 Any reluctance by federal courts to issue an injunction against a state criminal prosecution therefore results not only from a high regard for federal-state comity, but also from the prohibition imposed by statutory law. 4 The contrast with habeas corpus proceedings is apparent, for habeas is a form of relief guaranteed by the Constitution, 4 1 provided for expressly by statute, 42 and historically construed broadly by the courts. The statutory limitations on the power of federal courts to issue injunctions, together with one particular attempt by the Supreme Court to avoid these limitations, also explain the basic need for the Younger decision, and suggest the purpose behind the principles articulated in that decision. While Congress had provided certain statutory exceptions to the AntiInjunction Statute, there were few other ways to avoid the statute's application until the Court decided Dombrowski v. Pfister." That case held that the Anti-Injunction Statute did not apply in situations where no state prosecutions were pending, and that a federal court could strike down state statutes unconstitutional on their face. 45 This left open the question of whether federal injunctions could issue to forbid prosecution under an unconstitutional state statute when state proceedings had already been instituted. 46 To stem the ensuing flood of pleas for intervention by federal courts 47 the Court was forced to limit in some way the relief authorized by Dombrowski. The Court did this not by use of the Anti-Injunction Statute, but by resort to the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief from the judicial system. The use of these prerequisites-the threat of irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law-was said by the Court to be justified also by notions of federal-state comity. 4s The courts in Moore and Scranton applied corpus stems from the very nature and history of the writ. See generally Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
(1963).
Although the recent decision of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed in notes 77-79 infra, excluded fourth amendment claims from the scope of habeas corpus review, that ruling would appear to be based on the nature and purpose of the exclusionary rule, and may not indicate an end to broad construction of habeas jurisdiction.
44. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendant was an organization active in fostering civil rights for blacks in Louisiana. It brought suit to request an injunction against the operation of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Propaganda Control Law, on the ground that the statute by its terms violated the first amendment. The three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, holding that there had been no presentation of threatened irreparable injury to federal rights which warranted cutting short the normal adjudication of constitutional defenses in state criminal proceedings. 48. 401 U.S. at 43-45. Three distinct requirements are suggested by the Court which must be met by a plaintiff before he may successfully seek a federal injunction of state criminal proceedings. First, he must meet the traditional equitable standards, that is, irreparable harm is these principles in considering the harm suffered by a state defendant during the defense of a criminal prosecution, 49 and use them to support their dismissal of pretrial habeas petitions containing speedy trial claims. 50 It could therefore be argued that use of the equitable prerequisites in the habeas corpus context is improper when one considers that the prerequisites may have been used by the Younger Court, rather than the Anti-Injunction Statute, in order to retain a large degree of discretion over the issuance of injunctions. 51 The distinction between habeas and injunctive relief was thus ignored by these courts.
It is also instructive to examine the interests and policies on which the judgment. 57 In fact, it is the collateral-and inherently duplicative-nature of habeas relief which makes it a powerful constitutional guarantee against unlawful incarceration.
A stronger argument, however, for reliance on Younger is the substantial identity of the two doctrines' concern for the relationship between the federal and state judiciaries. The holding in Younger was motivated most significantly by considerations of "comity" and "Our Federalism." A proper respect for state functions was required of the federal courts, based on a recognition that "the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and . . .
[that] the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." 58 The judicial doctrine of exhaustion was founded on a similar concern for the role that state courts were felt to play in the vindication of federal rights. 59 These and other similarities between the two doctrines have been emphasized by many courts, 6 0 and recent Supreme 57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), which provides for habeas corpus relief in the absence of any final action by a state court.
58. 401 U.S. at 44. Although the Court in Younger "merged" the two concepts, "comity" and "Our Federalism" had traditionally been considered and applied separately. "Comity" was defined as the duty of respect owed by federal courts to state courts, arising from the principle that state courts share with federal courts the solemn responsibility of guaranteeing constitutional rights. "Our Federalism," however, was considered to be a broader concept, requiring federal courts to protect federal rights in a manner that would not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states. (1975) . In that case, the Court not only extended the application of Younger to injunction against state civil proceedings, but held that the Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention where the losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies. Id. at 607-09. This holding, although illustrating the Court's strong bias against federal intervention in yet another setting, would not seem to affect directly the resolution of a speedy trial claim in a habeas case, since the cases under discussion in this Note involve petitioners who have exhausted their state appellate remedies.
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Court decisions have greatly expanded the areas to which Younger applies, affirming that doctrine's continued vitality. 61 But regardless of the strength of this argument in favor of Younger's application to the habeas context in general, there are several considerations which militate strongly against the use of Younger to deny pretrial habeas review of a speedy trial claim. 62 First, the principle of comity relied on by Younger insures that federal courts will not, by their interference with state courts, convey a mistrust of the state courts' ability to resolve constitutional claims. 63 There is, however, certainly a question as to whether a state court or its criminal justice system deserves any deference when it has not complied with the constitution's mandate to grant the defendant a prompt hearing. In much the same way, the concept of "Our Federalism" promotes a significant state interest by discouraging the federal courts from unduly disrupting the smooth functioning of the state's judicial system. Again, however, an argument that a state's judiciary is functioning smoothly is a hard one to make in the face of a petitioner's long incarceration without trial. 64
61. This continued vitality of the Younger doctrine, especially as viewed through Schlesinger, was specifically relied on by the Second Circuit in Scranton. See 532 F.2d at 296.
62. Most courts that have applied Younger to deny review of a speedy trial claim have done so by citing the portion of that opinion which states that "the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution" for there to be "irreparable injury. 63. The fact that this concern exists is one reason that federal intervention in a state proceeding is considered so disruptive of good working relationships between the federal and state judicial systems. By intervening, the federal court is implying that the state court is not sufficiently competent to comprehend and apply federal constitutional law. See Recent Developments, The Availability of Federal Relief When No State Prosecution Is Pending, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 419, 426 (1975) .
64. Indeed, it can also be argued that the Younger doctrine itself contains exceptions which answer directly the concern that there exists an adequate and effective state forum.
One situation in which Younger will not compel a dismissal is one in which there is present any "bad faith" In summary, the presumption that state officials will adequately protect federal constitutional rights exists only where prosecution is undertaken in good faith without harassment, and in the absence of any other extraordinary circumstances. A failure by the state to so act indicates that only federal intervention remains to vindicate a defendant's constitutional rights. It should also be pointed out that the application of Younger in this context is contrary to the rationale for a traditional exception to the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. In appropriate cases, inordinate delay in a state's judicial process may preclude a state from relying on the exhaustion requirement to defeat federal review, on the premise that the state has by its delay rendered any possible remedy ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights, whether the delay occurs before 65 or after 66 final conviction.
67
A strong argument can thus be made that Younger and its progeny should not be applied to bar an injunction against further state criminal prosecution of a defendant who has been denied his right to a speedy trial. The most recent solution to this habeas corpus problem, however, does not address the issue. 67. This points out yet another similarity, albeit an unfortunate one, between the Younger doctrine and the exhaustion requirement: when a state court does not allow an individual to present his claims, or provides a forum that does not render its decision on his claims with reasonable dispatch, any invocation of Younger or the exhaustion requirement serves only to shield an invasion of the petitioner's rights. See generally Palmer v. Judge and District Attorney of the 13th Judicial Dist. of Tenn., 411 F. Supp. 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). This opinion is either a very courageous or a remarkably uninformed decision, for it granted a pretrial petition containing a speedy trial claim with no reference either to the warnings in Braden or the principles of Younger. When confronted by the state's contentions that the federal court should refrain from acting since the petitioner could present his speedy trial claim at his trial, the court stated: "The fact that the state may finally be ready to move when the federal court raises its hand is no cure for the infection and potentially irreparable injury wreaked by the delay." the Fifth Circuit. The issue considered by the court was stated simply as "whether petitioner has any right to invoke federal habeas corpus in view of the fact that he has not yet been tried on the indictment . . "..- 69 In holding that the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies, the court denied relief on the basis of the distinction made by Braden between a petitioner who seeks to abort a state proceeding and one who seeks only to enforce the state's obligation to bring him promptly to trial. 70 According to the court, the distinction should be made on the basis of the type of relief sought: an attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise to prevent a prosecution is an effort to abort a state proceeding, while an attempt to force the state to go to trial is an attempt to enforce a valid obligation of the state. 7 1 To justify its holding that dismissal of the charges is an objective not obtainable through federal habeas corpus, the court stated that:
[A] claim that indictments should be dismissed because of an already accomplished violation of a speedy trial right amounts to an attempt to assert an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.
72
The court based its holding strictly on the guidance provided by Braden, with no attempt to rely on the Younger principles of federalism and comity. The court's analysis separated violations of the right to a speedy trial into two categories: a present denial of the right, which a federal court may remedy by commanding the state to bring a prisoner to trial, and a past or completed denial of the right, which is an affirmative defense that must be litigated at trial before consideration by the federal courts. the time he filed for habeas relief. While serving a sentence for armed robbery, the petitioner learned of the existence of two assault-related charges against him outstanding in a Texas county. After various attempts over a period of two years to have these charges brought to trial, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial claim. After this motion was denied by the trial court and all Texas appellate courts, the petitioner requested federal habeas 69. 530 F.2d at 1282. The petition filed with the district court definitely requested a dismissal of the charges pending in state court but was also deemed by the court to request that, in the alternative, the state should be forced to begin trial. Due to this construction of the petition, the court ruled that the petition would be subject to review as a claim of present denial of a speedy trial, provided the petitioner followed certain detailed state procedures. 
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This subdivision of the right to a speedy trial can be seen as the result of a judicial compromise. One alternative would have been to hold that the exhaustion requirement could be met only after all affirmative defenses, including a speedy trial claim, had been presented at state trial and a conviction returned. 73 This alternative clearly would have been unacceptable, however, since the constitutional right to a speedy trial could be defeated by a state court's refusal ever to bring a prisoner to trial. 74 The other alternative would have been to allow review of a speedy trial claim after such claim had been presented by motion at all levels of the state judicial system, whether or not the petitioner was requesting dismissal of the charges or simply demanding a trial. This view represented the state of the law prior to Braden, but proved unacceptable to the court in that decision. 75 An examination of several other recent decisions 76 indicates the reason this alternative has been rejected: the scope of habeas corpus, characterized as a "serious intrusion on values important to our system of government, ', 77 has undergone a general constriction. 78 It has been suggested that this constriction, in turn, is a result of a reluctance of the Court to grant habeas relief for "non-'guilt-related' constitutional violations." 79 The compromise by subdivision of the right appears to be one which guarantees that a state prisoner will not remain imprisoned indefinitely without a trial, yet one which also gives the state a last opportunity to fulfill its constitutional responsibility before a federal court completely divests the state of its control over the prisoner. This compromise, which has resulted from the interplay between concern for basic enforcement of the speedy trial right and a general decision to constrict the scope of federal review of state decisions, is not itself immune from criticism. The courts now applying this compromise are in reality granting a form of relief which has traditionally been considered to be inadequate for the violation of the right to a speedy trial. The absolute and complete discharge of a prisoner has been considered the only effective remedy 0 because prosecutors, who were free to commence another prosecution after the speedy trial claim had been sustained, would not be deterred from causing undue delay in the future. 8 " The remedy now applied, that of requiring trial by the state within a reasonable time, had been previously suggested as appropriate by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Smith v. Hooey. 82 The majority of the present Court, however, had recently 82. 393 U.S. 374, 384 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that a decision holding that the right to a speedy trial had been violated should not result in the automatic Vol. 1977:707] stated that although the remedy of dismissal is a very serious and severe one, "it is the only possible remedy." 83 While the above language would seem to prohibit the remedy applied in Braden, a closer analysis indicates that such a remedy will quite adequately serve to protect the right to a speedy trial. According to the Court, the guarantee of a speedy trial is an important safeguard which prevents "undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial . . . and [limits] the possibility that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." 84 In a very real sense, the interest served by the guarantee of a speedy trial may therefore be insured by two different remedies. The "undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial" may be alleviated by requiring the state to bring a habeas petitioner to trial, and the prejudice to his defense may be cured after he has suffered a conviction (and the prejudice to his defense has become apparent) 8 5 by ordering a dismissal of all charges.
CONCLUSION
Although federal courts initially demonstrated a willingness to review a habeas corpus petition claiming denial of a speedy trial notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had not yet been convicted by any state court, that position was substantially changed by the combined force of two significant events. The Supreme Court's decision in Braden suggested that a habeas petitioner requesting dismissal before trial had not exhausted his state remedies, and the Younger doctrine of federal-state comity was expanded to apply in many areas related to the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. Although the reliance upon Younger to justify a holding that exhaustion had not occurred may be misplaced, it is apparent that the change in this state of the law can be justified by considering Braden to be an attempt to fashion a remedy more responsive to the interests served by the right to a speedy trial. 83. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). The Court considered the remedy of dismissal to be unsatisfactorily severe, since a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without ever having been tried. Id. The Court pointed out, however, in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) (unanimous decision), that the denial of the right is unlike the denial of other rights, such as those guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments, which can be cured by providing a new trial or excluding certain evidence. The Court reaffirmed in that case that "in light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, the only possible remedy." 412 U.S. at 440.
84. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 85. Indeed, in determining whether there has been a violation of the right to a speedy trial, the prejudice to the petitioner's defense is a factor to be considered, along with the length of delay, the reason for the delay, and the defendant's assertion of his right. 
